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 Shadow banking is growing rapidly in a number of developing countries, 
including China where it recently was estimated to increase from approximately 40% of 
that country’s gross domestic product at the end of 2014 to approximately 78% of GDP at 
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the outset of 2016.3 The shadow-banking sector in developing countries is typically 
weakly regulated, yet the growth of the sector is thought to pose risks to financial 
stability. Additional regulation therefore may be needed. Any such regulation, however, 
should attempt to strike a balance between reducing that risk and preserving shadow 
banking as an important channel of alternative funding to developing economies, 
particularly in the face of significant retrenchment by large banks that had dominated the 
credit supply.          
 
 I. WHAT IS SHADOW BANKING? 
 
 Shadow banking is a loose term that refers to the provision of financing outside of 
traditional banking channels.4 Estimated at $67 trillion worldwide,5 shadow bank 
financing appears to dwarf traditional bank financing.6   
                                                 
3 Sara Hsu, No Stopping China’s Shadow Banking Beast (Sep. 20, 2016), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/09/20/no-stopping-chinas-shadow-banking-
beast/#684759a521cd (referencing estimates by Moody’s). Other estimates have set the 
amount of shadow banking in China at 36.8 trillion yuan, or “69 percent of China’s gross 
domestic product,” in 2013 (see David Barboza, Loans Practices of China’s Banks 
Raising Concern, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013 (referencing a report released in May 2013 by 
JPMorgan Chase)), and around 20 trillion yuan in 2012, which was then approximately a 
third the size of China’s bank-lending market (see In China, Hidden Risk of “Shadow 
Finance”, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2012, also available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324712504578133053914208788.html?
utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wsj%2Fxml%2
Frss%2F3_7013+(WSJ.com%3A+What's+News+Asia) (reporting an estimate by Sanford 
C. Bernstein & Co.)). But cf. Wei Jiang, The Future of Shadow Banking in China, 
JEROME A. CHAZEN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, available at 
http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/chazen/globalinsights/sites/globalinsights/files/Shadow%
20Banking%20in%20China_Chazen%20Institute.pdf (stating that Moody’s Investor 
Service estimated that China’s shadow-banking transactions equaled 85% of its GDP in 
2014). 
4 Chinese regulators appear to follow this same definition. See, e.g., Xiao Gang, 
Regulating Shadow Banking, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 2012) (writing that “[s]hadow 
banking can broadly be described as the system of credit intermediation involving entities 
and activities outside the regular banking system”). Xiao Gang is the chairman of the 
Board of Directors of Bank of China. In a recently promulgated regulation with respect to 
shadow banking in China, Circular No. 107, shadow banking is described as “credit 
intermediation entities and activities outside the traditional banking system.” See Robin 
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 There are many ways to provide financing outside of traditional banking channels. 
Structured finance and securitization, for examples, raise financing indirectly through the 
capital markets using special purpose entities (“SPEs”) such as asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) conduits and structured investment vehicles (commonly known as SIVs).7 
The term shadow banking also includes the provision of financing by finance companies, 
hedge funds, money market mutual funds, non-bank government-sponsored enterprises, 
securities lenders, and investment banks. The term even includes the provision of 
financing by banks using non-traditional means. For example, banks sometimes create 
and derive fee income from SPEs, ABCP conduits, and SIVs, as well as repo markets. 
Banks in particular are important players in Chinese shadow banking.8 
 
 II. SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA 
 
 China has the world’s highest rate of growth in shadow banking.9 Shadow 
banking has been especially important there as a source of funding to small and medium-
sized enterprises (“SME”s), including entrepreneurial start-up companies, because 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hui Huang, The Regulation of Shadow Banking in China: International and Comparative 
Perspectives, 30 B.F.L.R. 481, 483 (2015). 
5 Financial Stability Board, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report (Nov. 18, 2012) 
(estimating shadow banking’s worldwide assets in 2011). The most recent FSB Global 
Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2 (Nov. 12, 2015) bifurcates its estimate of shadow-
banking’s 2014 worldwide assets into a “narrow measure” of $36 trillion and a “broad 
measure” of $137 trillion.  
6 Zoltan Pozsar et al., Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 458: 
Shadow Banking Abstract, 4-5 (2010). 
7 For an introduction to structured finance and securitization in the context of China, see 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization, Structured Finance, and Covered Bonds (2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182597. 
8 Huang, supra note 4, at 487. See also James T. Areddy, Risks Are Cited as Banks Blur 
Lines, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2016, at C3 (discussing the extension of banking in China 
into aggressively “selling small-time investors short-term, high-yield products on-line”). 
9 Huang, supra note 4, at 485 (citing FSB’s Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 
2013).  
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Chinese banks have not readily extended credit to SMEs.10 The reluctance of banks to 
lend may reflect, in part, an unintended consequence of Chinese banking law, which has 
limited bank-loan profits to percentages of the loan,11 making small and medium-sized 
loans much less attractive than large loans.12 The reluctance to lend might also reflect the 
higher risks of SME lending, which sometimes exceed Chinese bank lending standards.13 
 
 The resulting alternative financing arrangements are deemed part of China’s 
shadow-banking sector. Participants in these arrangements include corporate-style 
entities such as property-development trusts14 as well as individuals involved in more 
interpersonal lending through credit associations, rural cooperative foundations, and even 
                                                 
10 Chinese banks tend to focus on lending to large Chinese companies and also investing 
abroad.  
11 Cf. Michael F. Martin, China’s Banking System: Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 10 & n. 24 (Feb. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42380.pdf  (“Historically, the [People’s Bank of China] 
has maintained a roughly 3% range between comparable deposit and loan benchmark 
rates, thereby insuring banks approximately a 3% gross profit margin.”). 
12 The People’s Bank of China may now have removed the limitation on bank lending 
rates, except regarding certain loans (such as residential mortgage loans). E-mail from 
Liu Xiaoli, Associate at the Zhong Lun Law Firm in Beijing and Duke Law School 
LL.M. Class of 2013, to the author, May 6, 2013.  
13 Cf. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, Associate at the Zhong Lun Law Firm in Beijing and Duke 
Law School LL.M. Class of 2013, to the author, Nov. 11, 2012 (observing that China’s 
banking industry has strict loan underwriting standards, and SMEs often cannot provide 
sufficient collateral to satisfy these standards). Ms. Liu nonetheless also observes that, in 
recent years, the State Council and financial regulators have been actively encouraging 
SME financing; as a result, some banks have been expanding their SME loan business. 
Id.  
14 See Shadow Banking Looms Over China, REUTERS, Sept. 28, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/china-trusts-banking-
idUSL4E8KS50J20120928 (reporting the rise of trusts in China, and particularly their 
exposure to the “property, infrastructure, and financial sectors”); see also, DELOITTE 
TOUCHE TOHMATSU LIMITED, CHINA REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT HANDBOOK, 51 & 81 
(2012),  available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
China/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Real%20estate/cn_RE_REIH2012_130312
.pdf. (quoting the OECD definition of a REIT as a “widely held company, trust or 
contractual or fiduciary arrangement that derives its income primarily from long-term 
investment in immovable property (real estate), distributes most of that income annually 
and does not pay income tax on income related to immovable property that is so 
distributed.”). 
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pawnshops.15 Peer-to-peer business lending is also becoming common, in which 
companies lend to other companies, sometimes arranged through banks.16 Equipment-
lease financing is increasing, sometimes arranged through the leasing subsidiaries of 
state-owned banks.17 Accounts receivable factoring is also increasing in importance, to 
provide liquidity to vendors of goods.18 As with securitization, factoring additionally 
enables those vendors to allocate risk on the receivables to third parties (in the case of 
factoring, those third parties are the “factors” who provide the financing), enabling 
vendors to quantify their repayment risk. Risk allocation is increasingly critical because 
receivables are becoming increasingly delinquent in payment.19   
 
                                                 
15 Kellee S. Tsai, Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China 39 (2002). 
16 See China Slowdown Stymies Plan to Curb Shadow-Banking Risks, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, July 17, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-16/slowdown-
threatens-curbs-on-shadow-banking#p2 (“Shadow banking, including loans changing 
hands between friends, families and companies seeking capital as well as the off-balance-
sheet business of lenders and trust companies, totals as much as 15 trillion yuan ($2.4 
trillion), about one-third the size of China’s official loan market”). Many peer-to-peer 
sites exist that allow small businesses to access loans from individuals and other 
businesses. China Shadow Bankers Go Online as Peer-to-Peer Sites Boom, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, July 24, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-23/china-shadow-
bankers-go-online-as-peer-to-peer-sites-boom.html. Incongruously, peer-to-peer lending 
among enterprises is technically illegal (and thus risky for lenders) under Chinese 
financial regulatory law. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 12. Nonetheless, courts often 
enforce lenders’ repayment claims for principal and, to the extent not exceeding 
comparable bank deposit interest rates, interest. Id.  
17 Cf. Jonas Alsen, An Introduction to Chinese Property Law, 20 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 
1, 38 (1996 ) (describing financial lease terms in China).  
18 Factors Chain International, Total Factoring Volume by Country in the Last 7 Years 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.fci.nl/about-fci/statistics/total-factoring-volume-
by-country-last-7-years (showing the rapid growth of Chinese factoring volume to 
become one of the largest factoring markets in the world). 
19 Hu Xuwei & Lin Xiaozhuan, The Causes and Risk Management of SME’s Accounts 
Receivable  
Based on Information Asymmetry, 212 (2009), 
http://www.seiofbluemountain.com/upload/product/200911/2009zxqyhy03a24.pdf 
(observing the high total volume, as well as the high default rates, of Chinese accounts 
receivable).  
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 China’s shadow-banking sector also includes, as mentioned, the provision of 
financing by banks, using non-traditional means.20 Commercial banks, for example, 
provide wealth management plans to their customers, as investors. Customers entrust 
funds with their bank and join the plan; the bank uses the entrusted funds to invest in a 
pool of securities—functionally no different than an investment in a mutual fund. Wealth 
management plans have grown rapidly, estimated to grow from 8.5 trillion yuan in 2011 
to 12 trillion yuan in 201221 to as much as 18.8 trillion yuan in 2015.22 From an investor 
standpoint, the reason for this growth appears to be risk aversion: investors believe, 
rightly or wrongly, that wealth management plans provided by banks are safe because of 
banks’ implicit guarantees.23 From a bank standpoint, the reason for this growth appears 
to be regulatory arbitrage: it enables banks to avoid regulation that limits, among other 
things, their loan-to-deposit ratios.24 
 
 More recently, China’s shadow-banking sector has expanded to the Internet, 
inspired by the government’s “Internet Plus” initiative—a plan intended to drive 
                                                 
20 Cf. supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (observing that the term shadow banking 
even includes the provision of financing by banks using non-traditional means). 
21 Wang Xiaotian, Banks’ Wealth Management Products Have Growing Risks: Fitch, 
CHINA DAILY, Dec. 05, 2012, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-
12/05/content_15989924.htm. 
22 Justina Lee, China’s Shadow Banking Evolves to Dodge Crackdown, BLOOMBERG, 
Feb. 25, 2016, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-24/china-
shadow-banking-dodges-crackdown-as-funds-take-trusts-role. Cf. Avnita Lakhani, 
China’s Shadow Banking Industry and Impact on Capital Markets: Ignoring the Lessons 
of the Past, 7 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. 1, 20 (2015) (stating that WMPS and trust-asset 
financing in China have gone from a valuation of 3 trillion RMB in 2010 to 10-15 trillion 
RMB in March 2014). 
23 E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, Associate at the Zhong Lun Law Firm in Beijing and Duke 
Law School LL.M. Class of 2013, to the author (Apr. 16, 2013). See also Edward 
Chancellor, China Crunch Shows Financial Fragility, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 1, 2013, at 
20 (observing that “Many [Chinese wealth management products] are kept off the 
balance sheets of the banks although it is widely understood that banks will make good 
any losses to investors.”). 
24 E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 23. See also Cai Zhen, The Features, 
Manifestations and Causes of the Chinese Shadow Banking System, 11 CHINESE BANKER 
(2012), available at http://ifb.cass.cn/show_news.asp?id=51623. 
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economic growth by integrating Internet technologies with manufacturing and business.25 
The scope of this initiative includes Internet Plus Finance, involving such key 
participants as (Alibaba affiliates) Alipay and Ant Financial which arrange for on-line 
collections and payments.26 The rapid expansion of Internet Plus Finance provides a 
cautionary tale, though. Because of its genesis at the highest political levels and also 
because Internet financial firms did not clearly fall into one of the traditional Chinese 
regulatory silos of banking, securities, or insurance, Internet Plus Finance was initially 
unregulated.27 After a series of prominent frauds,28 however, the widespread petitions for 
help by fraud victims to government authorities29 have resulted in a political backlash 
and potential regulatory overreaction.30    
 
 The changing details of China’s shadow-banking sector are less important,31 
however, than the fact that it—like the shadow-banking sector outside of China—reflects 
non-bank, or at least non-traditional-bank, intermediated financing.32  
                                                 
25 In March 2015, Chinese Premier Li launched the Internet Plus initiative in a report to 
the 12th National People’s Congress. In July of that year, the State Council released “The 
Guiding Opinions on Promoting Internet Plus Initiative.” On Oct. 29, 2015, the Fifth 
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party accepted  the 
“internet plus” initiative as a major economic strategy.  
26 See, e.g., “PBOC to Study Aliaba’s Shadow Banking Activities, Zhou Says,” 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 24, 2016 (describing Alipay as “China’s biggest internet 
payment service,” with 450 million users).  
27 In discussions with the author, Professor Wang Zuofa analogized this regulatory lapse 
to the Chinese proverb, “You take home the child that you’ve spawned.” Those Internet 
firms were not clearly the “children” of any given banking, securities, or insurance 
regulator. 
28 For example, a company named E-finance(BeiJing) Internet Technology Co., Ltd. is 
reputed to have defrauded almost a million people of more than 50 billion yuan. E-mail 
from Prof. Wang Zuofa to the author, Nov. 13, 2016. 
29 Professor Wang Zuofa calls this type of political approach “shangfang.” 
30 See e-mail from Prof. Wang, supra note 28 (also explaining that, absent harm, 
regulators are reluctant to respond to market innovations and would rather make their 
decisions and act according to the principle of “be responsible to the upper level leader, 
not to the market”; but when those leaders get alarmed, the regulators tend to overreact to 
show their political loyalty). 
31 Recently, for example, Chinese shadow banking has begun to encompass “debt 
receivables,” referring to off-balance-sheet loans made through trust and brokerage 
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 In January 2014, the Chinese government released State Council Circular No. 
107,33 which sets out an overarching framework for regulating shadow banking in China. 
Under this framework, the particular governmental regulator (either banking, securities, 
or insurance) that approves the establishment of a shadow-banking entity is theoretically 
responsible for regulating it. But because similar financial products are sometimes subject 
to different regulators,34 the framework may have certain inconsistencies and 
inefficiencies.35 Commentators remain dubious of the framework’s effectiveness.36  
 
 III. SHADOW BANKING IN OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 The author first investigated shadow banking in China in connection with a series 
of lectures given there in December 2012 and May 2016.37 The author’s understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                 
companies in order to reduce capital requirements or hide non-performing loans. Hsu, 
supra note 3.  
32 Cf. Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, Bank of England, Remarks at a 
BGC Partners Seminar: Shadow Banking, Financing Markets and Financial Stability 
(Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech420.pdf (observing 
that we may “confront new variants of shadow banking in the future”). 
33 Huang, supra note 4, at 482. The official name of Circular No. 107 is Guowuyuan 
Bangongting Guanyu Jiaqing Yingzi Yinhang Jianguan Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi 
[Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Relevant Issues of Strengthening 
the Regulation of Shadow Banking]. 
34 Huang, supra note 4, at 491 (observing, among other things, that some products such 
as securitization are cross-sector in nature and do not fit neatly into sector classifications). 
35 Professor Huang argues that there is a mismatch between China’s regulatory structure 
and the underlying market it regulates. Id. To address that, he proposes the creation of an 
interagency oversight council on shadow banking to facilitate coordination and to share 
information in order to identify regulatory gaps. Id. at 494-95. 
36 See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 3 (observing that “China’s shadow banking beast won’t be 
tamed anytime soon. Although it never really disappeared, there was a brief period of 
time from late 2014 to early 2015 when it seemed like some of the worst practices were 
to be regulated. This didn’t work . . . . [B]anks and local governments have become 
increasingly reliant on the industry, to their great disadvantage.”).  
37 Even in that context, however, the author’s investigation was limited to conversations 
with Chinese financial regulatory experts as well as research of the relevant literature.   
 Shadow Banking - Developing Countries.docx 
9 
shadow banking in developing countries outside of China (“other developing countries”) 
is much more limited. Nonetheless, some general observations can be made.  
 
 Although banks still dominate the financial sector in most other developing 
countries, shadow banking is on the rise.38 In those countries, however, shadow banking 
is “less about long, complex, opaque chains of intermediation and more about being 
weakly regulated or falling outside the regulatory sphere altogether.”39  
 
 For example, the main shadow banking players in other developing countries tend 
to be “finance, leasing, and factoring companies; investment and equity funds; insurance 
companies; pawn shops; and underground entities.”40 These players overlap significantly 
with Chinese shadow banking market participants.41 Also as in China,42 shadow banking 
is important in other developing countries as a source of funding to SMEs.43  
 
 Unlike China, however—and other than India—the financial markets of many 
developing countries are only partially integrated with global financial markets.44 
Shadow banking in those countries therefore, at last currently, poses little systemic risk.45 
                                                 
38 Swati Ghosh, Ines Gonzalez del Mazo, & İnci Ötker-Robe, Chasing the Shadows: How 
Significant Is Shadow Banking in Emerging Markets?, The World Bank (Sep. 2012), at 2-
3, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/EP88.pdf. 
Cf. Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015, supra note 5 at 3 (observing that 
“Emerging market economies (EMEs) showed the most rapid increases in [shadow-
banking] assets.”). 
39 Ghosh et al., supra note 38, at 3-4. 
40 Id. at 2. 
41 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (indicating an overlap for pawnshops, 
investment funds, leasing companies, and factoring companies). 
42 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
43 Viral V. Acharya, Hemal Khandwala & T. Sabri Oncu, The Growth of a Shadow 
Banking System in Emerging Markets: Evidence from India, 39 J. INT. MONEY FIN. 208, 
209 (2013) (finding that shadow banking provides a “completeness of credit spectrum in 
the economy” because of its greater ability, compared to traditional banking, in reaching 
out to SMEs as well as borrowers in rural areas and emerging infrastructure developers). 
44 United Nations, Chapter 3: International Finance for Development, WORLD 
ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS, 80 (2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_archive/2013chap3.pdf. 
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 IV. SHOULD SHADOW BANKING BE REGULATED? 
 
 Shadow banking tends to be much less regulated than traditional banking.46 This 
inevitably means that shadow banking is, to some extent, driven by regulatory 
arbitrage.47 But that does not necessarily indicate that shadow banking should be 
subjected to more regulation. It sometimes might reflect, for example, that traditional 
banking should be subject to less regulation. Shadow-banking financing alternatives have 
particular salience when traditional banking is subject to ill-inspired regulation that drives 
regulatory arbitrage, such as China’s banking law limits on bank-loan profits.48 The 
determinative issue is thus the consequences of the regulation.  
 
 In deciding how to regulate shadow banking, it additionally is important to 
acknowledge that shadow banking has the potential to increase economic efficiency but 
also to increase risk.49 Consider each in turn. 
 
 Increasing Economic Efficiency. Shadow banking can increase efficiency through 
disintermediation and decentralization. Disintermediation refers to the distinguishing 
feature of shadow banking: providing financing outside of traditional banking channels.50 
This helps companies avoid having to pay the profit markup that intermediary banks 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 Id. 
46 The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has begun to address regulatory 
arbitrage concerns, however, such as by imposing net capital regulations on trust 
companies (requiring them to maintain sufficient net capital to cover their potential 
business risks). E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 13. 
47 Cf. Ghosh et al., supra note 38, at 3 (observing that regulatory arbitrage “played a role 
in the growth of (unregulated) shadow banking [in] China, Bulgaria, Croatia, and 
Romania”). 
48 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. Cf. Chancellor, supra note 23 
(observing that a “collapse in the supply of credit . . . can also arise as a result of 
regulatory actions”).    
49 Cf. Ghosh et al., supra note 38, at 2 (observing that it “is generally agreed that financial 
intermediation through nonbank channels [i.e., shadow banking] provides some benefits, 
and hence can constitute a useful part of the financial system”).  
50 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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would otherwise charge on traditional products, such as loans. That reduction in cost can 
increase economic efficiency. 
 
 Shadow banking can additionally increase efficiency by diversifying, and thus 
decentralizing, the provision of financial products and services. It also widens and 
deepens funding sources. This can increase consumer welfare, for example, by allowing 
investors to tailor financial portfolios to their own preferences. Consumer welfare can 
also be increased by serving underserved constituents, such as shadow banking’s 
providing financing to underserved SMEs in China.51 A decentralized financial system 
may also be more robust in the face of negative shocks. To the extent decentralization 
helps to reduce the size of firms, it also can mitigate the “too big to fail” problem.  
 
 Increasing Risk. But decentralization can also increase risk. For example, it may 
be relatively harder to control market failures, or there could be more such failures. 
Decentralization might also make it more difficult for market participants to effectively 
process information, allowing risks to accumulate unnoticed and unchecked. When 
hidden risks suddenly become apparent, market participants can panic52; and panics can 
trigger systemic risk.53  
 
 Another risk closely associated with, although not at confined to, shadow 
banking54 is the short-term funding of long-term capital needs, such as occurs when SPEs 
issue short-term securities (like commercial paper) to fund long-term projects55 or, 
                                                 
51 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
52 Daniel Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial 
Markets, 2 HARVARD BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 235 (2012).  
53 Panics often serve as a trigger that can commence a chain of systemic failures. Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 193, 214 (2008).  
54 Traditional banks, for example, typically fund themselves through short-term deposits 
and use the proceeds to make long-term loans. 
55 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing ABCP conduits and SIVs, which 
do this). See also Ghosh et al., supra note 38, at 3 (observing that “many, if not most, 
[shadow banks] fund themselves through short-term or callable deposit-like liabilities”). 
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common in China, when wealth management plans56 use short-term financing to fund 
long-term projects. This can increase risk by creating liquidity discontinuities (what 
economists sometimes call maturity transformation), which can have potentially systemic 
consequences. In traditional banking, this is labeled the risk of a “bank run.” Economists 
argue that equivalent types of liquidity discontinuities in shadow banking “played a 
central role in transforming concerns about the credit quality of mortgage-related assets 
into a global financial crisis.”57   
 
 Additionally, because non-bank shadow banking participants are unregulated or 
lightly regulated compared to banks, they might be more likely to fail than banks. Their 
failures could impact traditional banking to the extent shadow banks and traditional banks 
have contractual (or other) interrelationships.58    
 
 Shadow banking can also greatly exacerbate the externalities caused by corporate 
limited liability.59 In the relatively small firms that dominate shadow banking, equity 
investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability gives these investor-managers 
strong incentives to take risks that might generate outsized personal profits, even if that 
greatly increases systemic risk.60 That potentiates moral hazard and causes a 
misalignment of investor and societal interests.   
 
                                                 
56 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing wealth management plans). 
57 See, e.g., Daniel Covitz, Nellie Liang & Gustavo Suarez, The Evolution of a Financial 
Crisis: Panic in the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Market, Fed. Reserve Bd. Finance 
and Discussion Series, #2009‐36 (2009), at 16, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf (examining the 
inability of many ABCP conduits to roll over their short-term commercial paper in the 
last five months of 2007).  
58 Even given such interrelationships, however, it is unclear whether the decentralization 
of shadow banking actually reduces systemic risk on a net basis; a shadow bank may well 
be more likely to fail than a traditional bank, but the failure of a shadow bank is less 
likely to systemically impact traditional banking.  
59 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking 
Assumptions about Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2014). 
60 Id. at 1.  
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 Shadow banking thus can operate as a double-edged sword, increasing both 
efficiencies and risks. The challenge for regulation is to minimize those risks while 
maximizing (or at least not significantly impairing) those efficiencies. Next consider how 
that might be accomplished. 
 
 V. REGULATING SHADOW BANKING 
 
 A. Regulation Focused on Maximizing Economic Efficiency 
 Regulation can maximize economic efficiency by correcting “market” failures. At 
least four types of partly interrelated market failures can occur within the shadow-
banking sector: information failure, rationality failure, principal-agent failure, and 
incentive failure.61 None of these failures is unique to shadow banking, but all can be 
exacerbated by shadow banking’s complexity.  
 
 1. Information Failure. 
 Shadow banking can be complex and arguably is becoming more complex as 
economies develop.62 Although disclosure always will remain important and necessary,63 
complexity limits disclosure’s ability to achieve meaningful investor transparency.64 A 
question, therefore, is whether regulators should try to simplify or standardize shadow 
banking to minimize its complexity. Currently, this question may be more critical in the 
                                                 
61 Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 1. 
62 Cf. supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (observing a correlation between the 
complexity of shadow banking and developed economies). 
63 Cf. Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report, supra note 5 (arguing for more 
transparency). 
64 Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 
UTAH LAW REVIEW 1109, also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1113034; Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 1 (2004), also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=336685.  
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United States and other developed countries where shadow banking is especially 
complex.65   
 
 2. Rationality Failure. 
 Humans have bounded rationality. And the more complex something is, the more 
we tend to focus on the simpler and more straightforward elements with which we’re 
familiar. We also tend to believe what we want to believe. 
 
 Shadow banking increases complexity. As a result, market participants sometimes 
act even more irrationally. For example, investors were prepared to believe, based on 
mathematical models they did not fully understand, that the investment-grade rated 
securities issued in highly complex second-generation securitization transactions,66 
offering much higher returns than other similarly rated securities, represented good 
investments even though they were at least partly backed by subprime mortgage loans.  
 
 3. Principal-Agent Failure. 
 Conflicts of interest between managers and owners of firms are widely studied. At 
least in the shadow-banking sector, the more serious conflict appears to be intra-firm: 
secondary managers, such as analysts, are almost always paid under short-term 
compensation schemes, misaligning their interests with the long-term interests of the 
firm.67 This intra-firm principal-agent failure is not unique to shadow banking; but the 
complexity of shadow banking, combined with the technology that enables it, can 
exacerbate the failure. For example, the complexity of shadow banking motivated senior 
manager reliance on the imperfect value-at-risk, or VaR, model for measuring 
investment-portfolio risk, thereby enabling conflicted secondary managers to propose 
                                                 
65 Cf. Ghosh et al., supra note 38, at 3 (observing that in emerging market and developing 
economies, “the shadow banking sector is relatively simple, given the [lower] level of 
sophistication of financial markets and instruments”). 
66 These transactions included securitizations of collateralized-debt-obligation securities, 
or “ABS CDO” transactions.   
67 Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 457 (2009); also 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1322536. 
 Shadow Banking - Developing Countries.docx 
15 
dangerous investment products, like credit default swaps, which had low VaR risk 
profiles.68 
 
 4. Incentive Failure. 
 Technology has enabled the shadow-banking sector to finely disperse investment 
risk. In theory, that could be beneficial. But risk can sometimes be marginalized by 
becoming so widely dispersed that rational market participants individually lack the 
incentive to monitor it.69 
 
 Summary. Shadow banking regulation should focus on maximizing shadow 
banking’s potential to increase efficiency and minimizing its potential to increase risk. 
This article has so far discussed regulation focused on maximizing economic efficiency 
by correcting market failures. Regulation can help to control, but it cannot completely 
eliminate, those failures.70 Next consider shadow banking regulation focused on 
minimizing systemic risk.   
 
 B. Regulation Focused on Minimizing Systemic Risk 
 Regulation should also focus on minimizing shadow banking’s potential to trigger 
systemic risk.71 One way to minimize that potential is to make panics less likely.72 It is 
impossible, however, to identify and forestall all the causes of panics. To some extent, 
even the market failures already discussed could trigger panics or other systemic shocks. 
For example, information failure, principal-agent failure, and incentive failure could, 
individually or in combination, cause one or more large firms to overinvest, leading to 
                                                 
68 See id. at 460. 
69 Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
487 (2012); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1721606. 
70 Professor Huang argues, however, that Circular No. 107 represents a significant 
improvement to Chinese regulation of shadow banking by attempting to correct these 
market failures. Huang, supra note 4, at 500-01.  
71 Cf. Xiao Gang, supra note 4 (observing that “China’s shadow banking sector has 
become a potential source of systemic financial risk”). 
72 Cf. supra note 53 (observing that panics often serve as a trigger that can commence a 
chain of systemic failures). 
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bankruptcy; and rationality failure could cause prices of securities in a large financial 
market to collapse.  
 
 Regulation could indirectly help by limiting the factors that give rise to shadow 
banking. Because the most important factor is regulatory arbitrage,73 there is a circularity: 
greater regulation of shadow banks could reduce the risks of (by reducing) shadow 
banking, but at the possible cost of reducing efficiency. China appears to be trying to 
limit regulatory arbitrage by regulating at least some shadow banks.74 It can be difficult 
to know ex ante, however, whether enhanced regulation of non-banks optimally 
maximizes efficiency while minimizing risk.  
 
 Regulation might also be considered to reduce the interrelationships between 
shadow banks and traditional banks.75 That would make it less likely that the failure of a 
shadow bank could impact traditional banks. To the extent the interrelationships are 
created by contract, however, such regulation would necessarily reduce freedom of 
contracting. It is not clear that would be beneficial, even assuming it could be adequately 
monitored and enforced.  
 
 This article has also mentioned that limited liability can give investor-managers of 
shadow-banking firms strong incentives to take risks that might generate outsized 
personal profits, even if that greatly increases systemic risk.76 Any regulation that 
restricts limited liability, however, would have to balance the fact that limited liability 
also encourages investment by addressing investor risk aversion and reducing monitoring 
                                                 
73 Another factor giving rise to shadow banking may well be technology, which facilitates 
ever more sophisticated financial mechanisms. However, it would almost certainly be 
futile, if not counter-productive, to try to regulate the use of technology. 
74 See supra note 46 (observing that the CBRC has begun imposing net capital 
regulations on trust companies). 
75 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Cf. Huang, supra note 4, at 499 (arguing for 
separating the wealth management plan business of financial institutions into a separate 
department to minimize interrelationships). 
76 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
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costs.77 One such approach might be to restrict the limited liability protection of those 
investor-managers, such as capping it at two-times their investment.78 
 
 For these reasons, shadow-banking regulation might be able to mitigate, but 
cannot prevent, the occurrence of systemic shocks. There therefore should be more 
regulatory ex post approaches, such as trying to protect against systemic consequences 
that could result from these shocks.79 This regulatory approach is inspired by chaos 
theory, which holds that in complex engineering systems—and, the author has argued, 
also in complex financial systems80—failures are almost inevitable. Therefore regulatory 
remedies should focus on limiting the consequences of these failures.81 In other contexts, 
the author has shown how regulation could accomplish this, such as by ensuring liquidity 
to systemically important firms and markets and by privatizing sources of liquidity in 
order to help internalize externalities and motivate private-sector monitoring.82  
 
 Another question for further inquiry might be the extent to which regulation of 
shadow banking should tie more closely to particular factual patterns.83 For example, 
more regulatory attention could be given to managing the short-term funding of long-
                                                 
77 The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking, supra note 59, at 14.  
78 Id. at 25. 
79 Cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address 
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 75 (2013), also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271587 (arguing that ex post regulation is necessary). 
80 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 211 (2009); also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1240863. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits 
of Law, 2012 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 815, 829-33 (also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016434).  
83 Cf. e-mail from Dan Awrey, University Lecturer in Law & Finance, University of 
Oxford, to the author (Jan. 24, 2012; emphasis in original) (saying that he is “increasingly 
of the view that the prevailing notion of ‘shadow banking’—which throws a number of 
divergent institutions, instruments and markets into the same bucket—has become a 
meaningful obstacle to regulatory reform in a number of key areas (esp. wholesale 
funding markets). There are many different objects of (potential) regulation wrapped up 
in this definition, each manifesting different issues and requiring different regulatory 
responses.”).  
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term assets which, as mentioned, can create a risk of liquidity discontinuities with 
potentially systemic consequences.84 Chinese regulators appear to be very concerned 
about this risk.85  
 
 The market failure underlying this risk is partly an information failure: that 
investors in short-term debt may not individually have enough at stake to make it 
worthwhile to fully evaluate the transaction. Those investors therefore will not accurately 
price the repayment risk.86 One possible remedy might be to encourage the development 
of a liquidity-support industry. Such an industry could achieve an economy of scale in 
which professional liquidity providers have enough at stake to make that evaluation 
economically worthwhile.87   
                                                 
84 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and 
Responsibility Failure, 70 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW 1781 (2013), also 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2159455. Cf. Kyle Glazier, Bernanke: Financial 
Crisis Was a Structural Failure, BOND BUYER, Apr. 16, 2012, at 2 (quoting Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke as saying that “a key vulnerability of the 
[disintermediated or “shadow,” financial] system was the heavy reliance . . . on various 
forms of short-term wholesale funding”); Viral V. Acharya & S. Viswanathan, Leverage, 
Moral Hazard, and Liquidity, 66 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 99, 103 (2011) (observing that 
short-term funding of long-term projects “played an important role in the financial crisis 
of 2007 to 2009 and the period preceding it”). 
85 Xiao Gang, supra note 4. Xiao Gang observes that “China’s shadow banking is 
contributing to a growing liquidity risk in the financial markets. . . . [In] some cases 
short-term financing has been invested in long-term projects, and in such situations there 
is a possibility of a liquidity crisis being triggered if the markets were to be abruptly 
squeezed.” Id. 
86 Marginalizing Risk, supra note 69. Cf. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, “Shadow 
Banking Regulation,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 559 (Apr. 
2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr559.pdf (arguing 
that part of the problem of shadow banking is inaccurate pricing of risk). 
87 Cf. id. (arguing, among other things, that regulatory reform should focus on enabling 
more appropriate pricing of shadow bank liquidity arrangements). Other ways to mitigate 
the risk might include better standards on match-funding coverage, better internal 
controls on collateral valuation and margining policies, and internalizing externalities 
(such as mandating privately funded systemic risk funds). The international Basel III 
capital accord takes a match-funding coverage approach, for example, introducing a 
liquidity coverage requirement that banks hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to 
cover their total net cash outflows over 30 days and another requirement that banks 
maintain minimum yearly available amounts of stable funding. Jerome Walker, Rosali 





 The rapid but largely unregulated growth in shadow banking in developing 
countries such as China can jeopardize financial stability. A regulatory balance is needed 
to help protect that stability while preserving shadow banking as an important channel of 
alternative funding. 
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